[mnet-devel] Grid Of Trust -- pre-design

[Jim Dixon]

On Tue, 9 Dec 2003, [iso-8859-1] Some Guy wrote:

> > My real argument is that the big flat p2p networks that were proposed
> > around 1999-2001 are sitting ducks, easy targets for adversaries with any
> > resources. The next generation of p2p systems must be small, fluid, hard
> > to hit.  In military terms, the old-style networks are like Saddam
> > Hussain's big, soft, clumsy army.  New network architectures must be more
> > like al Quaida, built around personal trust.  They should be easy to
> > build, so that you think nothing of throwing them away.  They should
> > expect and react gracefully to attacks, fragmenting if necessary.  They
> > should be modular, so that if a better way of solving problems comes
> > along, you can just plug it in.  All of this makes it difficult for an
> > adversary to see them, let alone take action against them.
>
> I see things going 1 of 2 ways.  A large efficient network, built like
> a phalanx.  Where we all stand together.  This type of a network needs
> to be so damn useful that like the Internet they won't try to outlaw
> it.

Saddam would be proud of you.

The guys with the machine guns would delight in the neat, orderly ranks of
targets.  :-)

> > But I have _never_ suggested building a global DHT.  What I have suggested
> > is designing an infrastructure that can be used to implement p2p networks
> > of all sizes, using a variety of techniques.
>
> Ahhhhhh, well I am out to build a global DHT and a global premix.
> United it can stand divided it'll get killed.  Sure you and a dozen
> friends can all authenticate each other and make a 12 man DHT, it'll
> be 12 times as resistant to DoS, but if you're worried about the jerk
> with 2^14 CPUs lieing around I'm not sure what the points is.

In fact I am not worried about the guys with the 2^12 CPUs or for that
matter the guys with real firepower.  I don't propose to stand up and be
dutifully mowed down.  The idea is to build ad-hoc networks of all sizes
and for all purposes, none of which would look like a natural target.
Some of these networks might still get hit.  If they are properly
designed, they should just fragment and reform into different, smaller
networks, networks that might later coalesce back into larger and possibly
different networks.

The point is: don't be a target.

And then: don't make wrong assumptions about who the Adversary will be.

My experience is that the Adversary first and foremost will be --
configuration errors.

Right behind will be the script kiddies, people whose idea of a joke is
taking a network down.  They often have thousands of CPUs at their
disposal.

> > The large clusters, of course, will doubtless be global DHTs.  But they
> > will overlap, with many people belonging to more than one cluster - and
> > casually copying data from one to another.
> >
> > If the objective is anonymity, this is how to attain it.
>
> In order to get anonymity you're going to have to mix with people you
> don't know.  If it's only you and your 11 friends you're only 1/12th
> anonymous.

In order to be anonymous, you must have crowds.  Hashcash drives away the
crowds, as would a requirement for a dedicated 10G hard drive or burning
bandwidth 24x7 in constant recertification.

Anonymity requires lots of people, which means networks that are
user-friendly: flexible, easy to discard, cheap, hard to target,
ubiquitous, and easy, very easy, to use.

--
Jim Dixon  jdd at dixons.org   tel +44 117 982 0786  mobile +44 797 373 7881
http://jxcl.sourceforge.net                       Java unit test coverage
http://xlattice.sourceforge.net         p2p communications infrastructure



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